Abstract -The evaluation of information sharing risk has become of paramount importance in the Supply Chain scenario. Chain actors are demanded to release an increasing amount of sensitive data in order to compute more precise master plans. In such a context, privacy issues arise and semi-honest or selfish actors could try to break the chain to increase their market shares. The SecureSCM project is studying a solution to provide a secure computation framework to protect these data, framework that has to be tuned w.r.t. the overall chain criticalities. In this paper, we present our open source Matlab-based supply chain simulator (Supply Chain Risk Simulator, SCRS) focused on chain optimization and the computation of the overall chain information sharing risk.
INTRODUCTION
Collaborative supply chain management largely consists of the combined optimization of supply and delivery within the virtual organization defined by the supply chain boundaries. However, each actor participates to the coalition with its own goals, and if global optimization requires completely missing their objectives, actors may be tempted to adopt a noncooperative behaviour, e.g. by altering the information used for the global optimization in order to push the coalition back to a situation more favorable to them.
Supply chain optimization is based on data provided by each partner in the supply chain. In other words, each actor needs to share information with other partners or with a trusted external decision maker. Information to be shared may include information usually kept confidential, like per-item production and transport costs, prices, stock levels, and other inventory values. Their release or sharing can induce an assessment on the part of each actor of its own profitability [9] . In other words, if revealed, this information can lead to dysfunctional behaviour on the part of some actor. Therefore, supporting the representation and evaluation of risk factors lined to information sharing risks is an important requirement for supply-chain representation models.
In this work, we focus on supply chain risks due to misrepresentations of reality triggered by information sharing. We assume that supply chain actors act in a rational way, trying to maximize their profits [10] . Our approach relies on classic adversary and attack models, adapted for supply chain management. The resulting methodology is structured as follows.
First, we extract some key parameters from the supply chain's value transfers, including some that model the external environment, traditionally studied by supply chain risk analysis. Then, we use these parameters to estimate the probability of each individual actor misrepresenting reality when announcing its local parameters to the chain. Probability and impact of such misrepresentations, then, will be exploited for ranking the risk related to each actor. Our methodology is concretized in an open source full-fledged software simulation environment (Supply Chain Risk Simulator, SCRS) for computing the impact of misrepresentations. This environment supports impact estimation, i.e. identifying the performance indicators that could be affected by unfavorable events, that is a major issue of supply chain risk analysis since no consolidated and generally accepted system for measuring supply chain performance is available. The software is released under the BSD open source license and distributed using the well-known open community Matlab Central [11] . Our work fills the gap in supply chain research, since in literature, and especially in the open source scenario, there is no reference of automatic tools that provide an estimation of supply chain risk. Furthermore, SCRS lays the basis for further extensions in supply chain analysis.
The paper is organized as follow. Section II gives a description of the environment and the mathematical model over which the simulator is based. Section III describes the methodology used in the SecureSCM project [4] for the assessment of the risk in complex supply chains. Then, Section IV generally describes the software and Section V presents a real case study to proof simulator functionalities. Finally, Section VI gives our conclusions.
II. ADVERSARY AND ATTACK MODELS
In this Section, we focus on the threats coming from unfavourable events related to the disclosure of sensible data, depicting the scenario modeled by SCRS. Using the terminology of computer security, we will consider only adversarial models of insiders, dealing with insider attacks rather than with external risk factors such as intrusions by external attackers or changes in the market. Our notion of adversary is however somewhat looser than the one used in computer security, including deliberately adversarial behaviour as well as generic dysfunctional behaviour, e.g. the one caused by defective understanding, lack of professionalism or simply by ill-will on the part of the actors taking part in the supply chain.
An important category of adversary is the rational adversary. This category is designed to deal with the fact that a static distinction between good (honest or semi-honest) and bad (malicious) party is often unrealistic. According to this model, a rational adversary will simply take the behaviour that will maximize its own self-interest.
In the remainder of the Section, we will consider rational (semi-honest or malicious) parties collaborating in the supply chain and computing the risk associated with attack on the part of each actor.
For the sake of clarity, we assume initial semi-honest behaviour of participants when initially computing the actual operating conditions of the chain and the optimization strategy for the chain. Then, we directly associate the risk of dysfunctional behaviour with the rational behaviour of each party, where the probability of deviating from the protocol by mis-representing reality is estimated based on the operation of the chain.
We define three categories of attacks, representing both deliberate and non-deliberate dysfunctional behaviors on the part of rational adversaries.
The first category is related to misrepresentation of reality. This means that individual actors can lie, for example by supplying fictional values, for the computation of the optimum working point of the supply chain.
The second category of attacks is related to the disclosure of confidential values such as warehouse capacity, profit, and market price data other than those that describes an actor participation in the supply chain in a straightforward manner. Companies are usually reluctant to share such values since they are directly correlated to the company's competitiveness in the market.
The third category of attack relates to malicious behaviour during the execution of the protocol, such as forging values.
We shall now deal in detail with the first category of attacks, i.e. misrepresentation attacks. We attempt to develop a risk profile for each actor based on several factors that may contribute to selfish behaviour. We translate resulting values for each actor computed on the basis of these points in a probability value of an attack.
The actor perception of the chain's fairness, modeled as a distance between its fairness value and the actual profit it obtains from the chain. The actor perception of the potential outcome of an attack, modeled as the expected payoff of an attack. These factors are then translated in a probability value.
Finally, the overall risk for each actor is computed as probability of unilateral attack multiplied by the impact of the attack.
Qualitatively these factors express different drivers for an attack: the first one corresponds to the degree of unfairness an actor may be subject to, the second is linked to an actor's greed, the third encompasses the remainder, possibly less important, factors: among those we singled out, as a representative, the degree of replaceability of an actor. In the following, we try to give a mathematical representation of the listed factors, to be used in Section III to calculate the overall chain risk value.
A. (Percentual) distance from the Shapley value.
The problem of how profits of a coalition could be redistributed is a well-known one (it is an instance of the general problem of distributive justice). There are several kinds of solutions to the problem. Due to the subjectivity of satisfaction criteria for each agent, an objectively optimal solution cannot, in general, be attained; however, a solution fulfilling some largely accepted requirements can be obtained by following the prescriptions dictated by the Shapley Value (SV) [3] : each player should be given a payoff equal to the average of the contribution that he gives to each of the possible orders in which the actors can join the coalition (all orderings are regarded as equally likely). It is defined as an allocation of payoffs S i , where i is the index pointing to the i-th participant, defined as:
Here the sum is taken over all the n! permutations, whereas m i ( ) represents the marginal contribution of the actor i to the revenue of the coalition in that particular permutation, and it is defined formally as follows.
Let :
n n be a permutation of the n actors, and consider the elements (1), (2), …, (n) of the permutation ; considering the i-th actor, there will be an index n j , 1 , such that i= (j). Consider now the coalition consisting of j-1 elements { (1), (2), …, (j-1)} and the coalition consisting of j elements { (1), (2), …, (j-1)}: by definition i does not belong to the former coalition while, on the other hand, the latter coalition is obtained from the former precisely by adding the i-th actor. Now consider the revenue made possible by the former coalition, indicated by v({ (1), (2), …, (j-1)}) and the revenue made possible by the latter coalition, indicated by v({ (1), (2), …, (j)}), the difference between the two quantities For each actor, the risk factor is the distance i = (S i -i ), i.e. the difference between its own Shapley Value S i and the revenue i actually obtained by the player. Since the absolute value may depend on the units of measure, it is better to define this discrepancy in terms of the ratio between this difference and the Shapley Value itself.
We indicate by s i the following quantity:
This discrepancy is positive when the profit the actor is getting from the chain operation is lower than the Shapley Value.
B. Expected percentage gain from an attack
The expected gain from an attack is defined as the difference between the payoff The value calculated for this quantity influences the probability of attack and quantifies the greed of an actor. Also in this case, in order to factor out the effect of different units of measures, we adopt the assumption that a rational player will take into account the ratio between this difference and the payoff i : hence the percentage payoff upon attack is defined by
The value of this discrepancy measure is positive when the payoff from a unilateral attack is higher that the regular payoff.
In a whiteboard information sharing regime, where all the actors of the chain can access to all the data without restrictions, the potential attacker is able to compute a sharp value for this parameter, because she has all the information about the behavior of the chain. In an obfuscation regime, on the contrary, the potential attacker can only count on part of the information needed since critical parameters are not shared: over the values of the obfuscated parameters, the potential attacker can only produce educated guesses that can be expressed in terms of probability distributions (priors). Therefore, in an obfuscation regime the potential attacker will not be able to compute a sharp value but rather an expected value, based on the obfuscated parameters probability densities. Hence, as a suitable measure related to the greed of an actor we can use a ratio based on the average value < Several context factors (e.g., culture-related ones) can influence or reinforce individual propensity towards an attack. A complete analysis of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper; for the sake of clarity, here we focus on a merely topological aspect. Namely, we argue that the higher the number of actors in a layer of the chain that can provide a service, the less likely the actors of that layer will attack. We capture this aspect by defining a metrics m as the reciprocal of the number of the actors in a layer of the supply chain.
The value m i by definition belongs to the interval 1 , 0 , where the value 1 corresponds to the case where the actor is the only one in the chain who is able to provide a given service (e.g. is the only final reseller, or is the only manufacturer). This is a rough measure of actor centrality, and as such could be at first sight considered redundant with respect to the Shapley Value, however the above defined metrics s i , is based on the distance with the Shapley Value, hence this metrics brings relevant new information into the process of estimating the probability of an unilateral attack. Furthermore, after the obfuscation of some parameters, the Shapley Value might not be computable by individual actors; however, the cardinality of the possible competitors is likely to be still known. Hence, the contribution to the probability of an attack by the cardinality of the competitors is in some sense unavoidable. This simple parameter will be used in this paper's running example.
III. SECURESCM METHODOLOGY:
A PRIORI PROBABILITY OF AN ATTACK Let us now focus on the evaluation of the probability of an attack. We consider the attack as an unfavorable event, and we try to derive its a-priori probability based on expert evaluation of the three risk factors identified in Section II. This is an instance of the well-known problem of eliciting experts' knowledge in order to obtain probability distributions for an event, given the value of different context parameters [1, 2] . The result of this type of analysis is typically a multivariate probability distribution over a number of parameters.
Our problem consists in defining an attack probability distribution over the three joint variables, i.e. a function mapping each triple of values in a value of an a-priori probability of an attack. The function is defined as follows, where s is the percentage deviation from the Shapley value, g is the expected gain from an unilateral attack, and m is the reciprocal of the number of direct competitors. The dimensionality of the problem is lower than the above expression suggests, due to the fact that the topology of a supply chain is by definition fixed, since one can consider as fixed the number of competitors m 1 and can "mine" experts' knowledge in order to evaluate the bivariate density g s p m , .
Furthermore, we assume that the control variables s and g should be independent, i.e. they contribute independently to the determination of the probability of attack.
The rationale behind this choice is the fact that the two values quantify two "psychologically" distinct behavioural driving forces. In fact, s reflects the feeling of being treated unfairly and the probability of seeking a remedy if attacked, whereas g reflects the availability of possible increased payoffs, i.e., the consequent temptation and the probability of acting on one's greed and hence to behave in a malevolent manner.
Hence, the computation of a-priori probabilities requires the following steps:
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IV. THE RISK SUPPLY CHAIN SIMULATOR
Simulating the supply chain as it evolves is an excellent mechanism for evaluating risks, and supporting risk-based optimization. In our case, simulation provides the basis for a "risk-based" supply chain optimization and assessment based upon our primary concern, the probability of "attacks" as we have defined above. As part of this process, it is important to be able to tune parameters that are relevant to risk reduction.
SCRS is an open source supply chain risk simulator able to show the temporal evolution of both classical and centralized chains focusing on risk analysis. In the case of the centralized supply chain, the master plan chain initialization is performed in accordance with the parameters to be optimized (for instance, the minimization of costs and production time).
The simulator models the behaviour of the supply chain through the evolution of the supply chain parameters for each of the involved suppliers. This evolution mainly involves the triple (Shapley Delta, Payoff, Context), related to the probability of them of being an insider attacker (this relation is defined in Section III). The Shapley Delta is related to the dissatisfaction of a supplier; more in details, it is evaluated considering the difference between its importance in the chain using Shapley Values and the real revenue obtained by the chain. The payoff is related to the revenue gain obtained in the case of a specific attack, practically measuring the temptation of a certain attack. The context defines the external environmental factors that influence the possibility of being an attacker.
Being able to monitor this probability is one of the main contributions of the SCRS. Many advanced Supply chain simulators like "Guru" [5] and SmartSCOR [8] or literaturebased like SISCO [7] , were proposed but without including the risk analysis support.
The following Section describes the SCRS functionalities by means of a real case study performed within the SecureSCM project.
V. SUPPLY CHAIN SIMULATOR: A CASE STUDY
Our case study is a realistic supply chain of a big Italian company; to preserve the company's privacy, we continue calling it "the Company".
The Company Scenario used here is a typical "Master PlanSupply Chain", and SCRS needs to simulate the first and the most important stage in the forming of supply chain: the selection of participants. This can be considered as an optimization process that provides the supply chain initialization. In general, this optimization could have a single or a multiple objectives.
SCRS supports the definition of a set of policies that drives the decision process of chain participant selection. These policies can be varied at each round of the simulation.
The Company scenario involves two layers of suppliers that are fully controlled by the Company. The entire parameters exchanging process is considered as a whiteboard scenario. The initialization can be considered as multi objective optimization of production-time and costs.
The simulator performs the following steps for each round of the simulation:
1. Supply chain initialization using an optimization based on the supplier-declared parameters and Company's policy.
Each supplier is advised of the production volumes required from the Company according to its declared capacity (no fake at initialization) and the Company policy (no fake at initialization). 3. For each supplier the triple is computed together with
the correlation between this triple with the attack probability rules (defined previously). In general, the triple depends on the actual node parameters and context information. Using it, the probability of a supplier being an attacker is computed (if this is not the first round in the simulator, the probability must be correlated with prior knowledge of the chain state). 4. Using the computed probability and each supplier's impact (in terms of deviation from the Company's computed optima in case of attack), the risk is computed. 5. At the end of each supply chain round, suppliers are ordered by risk and the master plan can perform the risk reduction process (if necessary) in accordance with the defined strategy. 6. The results after the risk reduction are used as initialization for the next round.
A. Supply chain simulator: Company scenario results
This section presents the results obtained using parameters from the Company scenario as the input for the first round of the simulation. For the sake of conciseness, we will show the evolution of the chain by considering the policy "best price". Figure 1 shows the Company supply chain after the initialization process (step 1-2). The Supply Chain Monitor allows the construction of a supply chain from a pre-defined set of suppliers. The internal State Monitor (See Figure 1) can easily be displayed. The suppliers bordered in red were selected in accordance with the "best price" policy. The Company node is the master that coordinates the entire production and assembles the final product. In the following analysis, as would be expected, only those suppliers selected for this instance of the supply chain are simulated. Using the outcome of this initialization, the Shapley Delta value and payoff for every supplier are computed.
Parameters used in risk analysis are normalized either by: i) global normalization w.r.t. the entire supply chain, ii) local normalization w.r.t. each local maximum. Each type of normalization is described while presented in the following sections.
B. Shapley values and Shapley Delta computation
The Shapley values computation is performed for evaluating the difference between the real profit obtained by a supplier and its Shapley value inside a chain. This difference is named Shapley Delta.
The Tables and graphs, proposed in that Section, are directly produced by SCRS and describe the supply chain at each round. Table I shows the Shapley values of suppliers considering 50 units of 30 Euros each. We also show the global normalized Shapley value. This normalization is made w.r.t. the entire chain value.
The Shapley value computation used in this scenario consists of two main steps: i) compute the set of coalitions that produce final product, ii) evaluate the Shapley values.
Since the Company's products are assembled from the various inputs (components and subassemblies) of supply chain participants, this determines the possible supply chain variants.
This analysis facilitates the selection of the coalitions that contribute to the final product. These are in fact the set of all possible variants capable of satisfying the supply chain requirement(s). Each coalition can meet the entire Company demand or a subpart of it. From these variants, the different values necessary for the Shapley computation, characterizing each coalition, can be obtained. The developed Shapley Value computation strategy depends only on the requirements that define the final product composition and the sub-compositions at each node, and the relation between the sub-suppliers and the purchaser for each node.
It is worth noting that the Shapely Values can change dramatically if the Company demands changes. This is mainly due to the fact that the partitioning of requests amongst suppliers is dependant on the general demand. For instance, the Shapley Values in the case of a demand of 19 products by the Company produces the same Shapley Value for all suppliers (i.e. Shapley of 42€ or, with global normalization, the 2.8% of the entire chain value) except Company (i.e. Shapley of 231€).
Shapley Value is therefore related to the market trend. It can be considered static for the entire simulation, variable and therefore recomputed only in the case of high market demand variation or recomputed every time.
The real revenue is computed by chain optimization (simulator step 1). This Shapley Delta is normalized using local normalization on each supplier's Shapley value. Table II shows the Shapley delta results. The negative Shapley Delta means that the suppliers receives more that their Shapley. The suppliers not involved in that round have maximum Shapley Delta since their revenues are 0 (not considered by the master plan).
C. Impact and Payoff computation
In addition to the Shapley Delta, the impact and payoff are also computed for each supplier. Of course, the payoff values are strongly dependent on the chain optimization policy. In this scenario, using the "best price" policy, we use the approach described below to compute the payoff.
The payoff computed for each supplier selected by the masterplan is evaluated considering the maximum variation of possible "unit product cost" without the supplier being excluded from the master plan chain, or rather the maximum variation of "unit product cost" that is guaranteed to be selected by the optimization algorithm. This is fundamental because only the suppliers in the master plan obtain revenue. This is possible since simulation is totally "whiteboard" based. The variation of unit production costs can be positive or negative. A negative variation is intended to yield a larger product order form the purchaser. The final payoff chosen is the maximum of these two.
The payoff of a suppliers not involved in the chain is computed with the same objective, or rather becomes a member of the master plan. This in general implies, with the costs policy used, to lower the selling price. The payoff is the total amount of revenue obtained by this attack. The major benefits from this approach result from the inclusion of external information (competition with competitors outside the supply chain) in the supply chain impact calculation. The described payoff is a sure payoff, or rather the supplier knows exactly the expected payoff of their attack (thanks to the "whiteboard" scenario). In other cases where some information can be obfuscated, the payoff becomes an estimation computed on the average of a set of possible attacks.
Furthermore, the "whiteboard" scenario guarantees the assuredness of an attack and the relative payoff, while in the obfuscated ones it is not guaranteed. Summarizing, these assumptions proof that sharing information improves the effectiveness of an attack and therefore the tendency of being an attacker. In this situation, the deviation from the optimum for the entire supply chain is in fact equal and opposite to the loss or gain in the payoff for those suppliers impacted by the deviation.
Generally, in other scenarios, the payoff can be at least the minimum deviation from optima. This is true for the payoff of the masterplan-selected suppliers, where in the case of not masterplan-selected suppliers the impact is the difference between the enounced price used for the attack and the real one. For instance, an external supplier can reduce their price to 10 Euros for being included into the masterplan, but after the inclusion the final price must be 10 Euros raised, therefore the impact is 10 Euros for every good produced.
We stress the fact that as a result of the whiteboard approach, each supplier can identify those variations to their parameters that, where possible, will not lead to their exclusion from the chain. Without this shared knowledge, each node cannot be sure it will remain in the chain if it varies its parameters (e.g. unit production costs were increased). Nevertheless, the impact and payoff are computed in a similar way, they simply have a different meaning. In fact, the payoff is related to each supplier as profit derived from the current supply chain, while impact is related to the profit of the entire supply chain. Examining this example in detail, we see that in fact, S1:P1.2 has no competitors, that S3:P1.2 products the same type of product but does not have enough storage space to saturate the Company's production requirements for this round of simulation. Similar situation for S2:P1.1.
This implies that S1:P1.2 and S2:P1.1 have a great payoff. Regarding suppliers S1.2:P1.1.2 and S2.2:P1.1.2, they have the same unit production costs, therefore the type of attack considered cannot reach a payoff. Suppliers S1.2:P1.1.2 and S2.2:P1.1.2 have no payoff since they cannot perform an attack without the certain of being excluded from the master plan. Concerning suppliers S1:P1.1 and S1.1:P1.1.1, they are out of the master plan, therefore they have an expected payoff only if they will be included next time.
The payoff normalized are respectively, 50% (S1:P1.1 must halves the price for having the chance to be included into master plan) and 75% for S1.1:P1.1.1, since it is sufficient a less reduction in the real price. In the case of payoff the local normalization is used. In fact, the payoff is related to each supplier's actual business in the chain.
Therefore, a payoff of 100% is a doubling of each supplier's current profit. In the case of supplier not included in the chain, the normalization is performed considering their revenue in the case of being included in the masterplan.
With respect to the impact, we consider the percentage of impact with regard to the entire supply chain profit. In fact, the impact is related to the effect of an individual attack to the entire chain. The following table summarizes each absolute impact and the impact globally normalized.
D. Probability of being an attacker
At the end of simulation step 3, the probability of each supplier being an attacker is computed.
This can be obtained using the Bézier approach described in [1] or via a rule based system. In both the cases, the decision is made by an expert and can be tuned during each round. In what follows, we show the results based on a rule based system. Figure 4 shows the decision surface involving Payoff and Shapley Delta. This surface is only a preliminary initialization that can be modeled and refined by an expert. The surface is the output of Matlab Fuzzy toolbox used in the simulator.
An expert can model the results of this approach by changing the fuzzy rules that define the surface. The rules used for this initialization are:
Rules
1 If Shapley Delta is low and payoff is low then probability is low 2 If Shapley Delta is high and probability is high then the probability is high 3 If Shapley Delta is low and payoff is medium then probability is medium 4 If Shapley Delta is medium and payoff is low then probability is low 5 If Shapley Delta is high and payoff is low then probability is low
Further, existing rules can be modified or new ones can be added to produce a different surface. In the case of a rule based decision system, the Suppliers chain probability results at first stage are reported in Table V. In this case the probability that a single supplier will attack reaches alarming levels in three cases for suppliers "S1:P1.1", "S2:P1.1", and "S1.1:P1.1.1". It is obvious for the two to be kicked out by the master plan suppliers, since they are more interested in attacking. However, supplier S2:P1.1 reaches the highest level even being involved in the master plan. This is mainly due the high level of Shapley Delta since it is the only supplier involved into the master plan able to produce the P1.1 sub-product. This suggest that, if other supplier "S1:P1.1" will be involved, the probability level will be less preoccupant. Using the Bezier approach, the results can be varied by modifying the two Bezier curves for Shapley and Payoff independently. Figure 5 shows the Payoff cubic Bezier curve obtained with 4 points. The Bezier curves can be modified by dragging the points represented by the red "*" yielding the new curve. The Bezier based probability inference system currently uses a cubic Bezier curve, but can be extended to use more complex Bezier curves. Figure 6 shows the probability surface in the case of Bezier curve.
E. A. Risk Computation
After computing the probabilities, the risks can be obtained by the product of the probabilities and the impacts. Table 6 shows the risk obtained considering the rule based inference of probability described in Table 5 . Decision surface used in the case of Bezier-based probability inference. Even using the largest probability, the supplier "S2:P1.1" does not reach the highest level of risk since the impact is limited. At the end of each supply chain round every suppliers are ordered by risk and the master plan (Company) can perform the risk reduction process (step 5) in accordance with the defined strategy.
The risk analyzer simulation provides a visual evaluation of the chain state for every round due to the visualization of each supplier's internal status. This is accessible through the interface described in Figure 7 . Finally, the simulator includes the possibility of simulating an attack during a particular round and evaluates the chain's response.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed risk analyzer supports the monitoring of the probability of an insider attack from each supply chain actors and provides values for the relative risk indicators. The risk analyzer can be initialized for an optimization strategy defined by the coordinator (and as consequence chooses the suppliers from a set of candidates), and shows the chain status at each round for each supplier involved. The risk analyzer can also be used for simulating the outcome of a particular attack and the chain response as consequence.
SCRS has been developed internally of our group and will be released and distributed as open source within the most common communities. Going open source will allow the group to extend simulator capability to evaluate the most common risk associated to supply chain scenarios, using methodology that apply new and more complex algorithm for risk assessment.
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